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I N THE SUPREME C 0 U R T 
0 F THE STATE 0 F U T A H 
A. C. MC CALL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VS. 
TH0111AS H. YEJ''DTGCK, and 
R. F. SCHOBER~ an(~ UNION 
PACIFIC RAILRCAI. CC: iPJJJY, 
and OGDEI\ UNION ?L.Ii }]},.L\'.' 
DEPOT C0!,1P ANY, 
Defendants end Respondents. 
STATD1~:F~ OF THE CASE 
This is B.n aT'PC!:ll from a verc:ict of a 
jury in the Distric~~ c,lLlrt of 1.J'eber County, 
Utah, the Honorable Parley Norseth, Judge 
thBreo.f, pres ~-dine. For the convenience of 
the court and counseJ., the r~P.rties '~Arill be re-
ferred to as they 1..rere in the lower court 
wherein the appellant 1.-.ras the plaintj_f'f and 
the appelJ. ee was the o_efE-mdant.. This appeal 
is on questions of law only, and therefore only 
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'•· such parts of the transcript, and such excerpts 
as are relevant and pertinent to the law questions 
raised are made a _;Jart of this record. 
Plaintiff's amended compl8.int (omitting 
headi~"'.(?:2 ~md signr-:t1)rcs), is as follows: 
Plaintiff complains of the defendants and 
for cause o:r act ion 2 lleges: 
1. That at ali tir:es herelnafter set forth 
the defendant, Ogden Union Railway and Depot. 
Company, and defendant, Union Pacific ?v::1ilroad 
CompE>.ny, t.rere corporations du~y orgrmized and 
sxistins; undf':-r B.nd by virtue of the lm-rs of the 
State of Utah 2,nd doing business in 'Heber County, 
Utah .. 
:~. That at al1 tir1r-:'!s here1.nafte::' Eet forth 
the defenda_nt, Thomas H. Y:endrick ~ 1:U:•.S an em-
ployee and agent of the defendantt Unj_on Pacific 
Railroad Company, regulc:.rly srtJr;loyed by said 
railroad Company and acting ·:~Ti thin the scope of 
his employment. 
3. That at all times here1na.fter set forth 
the defendant, R. F. Schober, !rJas an agent and 
employee of the defendant, Ogden Union ?~.A.il vay 
and Depot Compe.ny, regularly employed by s.:1id 
rail~rn.y and depot company and acting within the 
scope of his emp1c;nre:nt. 
4. That on the mornirg of the 27th day of 
November 1952, the ple.int].ff 1N·J.s e.rrested and 
charged with a misd.f?!('Ennor by the defend,-::: nts" 
Thomas H. Kendrick :?nc1. R. F. Sehober, at V-:le 
Club Tavern, Ogden, Utah; that at said time cllld 
place the aforesaid ThomE.S n. Yendrick and R. F. 
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'. 
Schober were acting in the course of their employ-
~- ment as aforesaid; that said arrest was wrongful 
and without warrant or judicial order, or other 
authority of law; and at said time plaintiff was 
acting in a quiet, peaceable and law-abiding 
manner, and he had not committed any breach of 
the peace nor committed any offense, either a 
misdemeanor or felony, in or out of the presence 
of the defendants, or any of them; that in the 
process of said arrest, pl~intiff was assaulted 
at the Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company 
station, and again assaulted and dragged out of 
the Club Tavern in said Ogden City, Utah, by said 
defendants. 
5. That the defendants, Thomas H. Kendrick 
and R. F. Schober, unlawfully and wrongfully, 
under their authority as agents and employees of 
the defendants, Union Pacific Railroad Company and 
Ogden Union RaD_way and Depot Company, respective-
ly, took plaintiff and caused him to be detained 
and confined in the police station of said Ogden 
City, Weber County, Utah, and had the plaintiff 
booked as being drunk, and then and there by force 
and violence wrongfully and unlawfully, without 
process or commitment of any kind whatever had 
the said plaintiff incarcerated in the tank of 
said Police Headquarters in Ogden City which said 
tank is part of the jail at said Ogden City. 
6. That on or about the 28th day of November, 
1952, at Ogden, Weber County, Utah the defendants, 
and each of them, contriving, maliciously and 
intending to injure the plaintiff; falsely, 
maliciously and without probable cause procured 
and caused certain criminal processes to be issued 
against the plaintiff charging the plaintiff vith 
the commission of a criminal offense, to wit: the 
offense of drunkeness; that said complaint bears 
the file number of 27613 in the office of the 
Clerk of the City Court of Ogden City, Weber 
County, Utah. 
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7. That thereafter, on the 28th day of 
November, 1952 plaintiff was arraigned upon said 
complaint and entered a plea of 11not guilty", 
that on the 16th day of December, 1952, said case 
against plaintiff came on for trial for the 
supposed crL~e so charged by the defendants, and 
each of them, before the Honorable J. Quill 
Nebeker, Judge of the City Court of Ogden City. 
That at the conclusion of said trial said Judge 
Nebeker found the plaintiff "Not guilty". 
8. That by reason of the premises, plaintiff 
has suffered great pain and mental anguish and has 
been da~aged in his good name and reputation all 
to his damage in the sum of $10,000.00. 
9. That in doing the things herein alleged, 
the defendants, Thomas H. Kendrick and R. F. 
Schober, acted maliciously and were guilty of 
wanton disregard of the rights and feelings of 
the plaintiff, and by reason thereof, plaintiff 
demands exemplary and punitive damages against 
the said defendants in the s~~ of $10,000.00. 
\ffiEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment 
against said defendants, and each of them as 
follows: 
1. For the sum of $10,000 as compensatory 
damages; 
2. For the sum of $10,000 as exemplary and 
punitive drunages; 
3. For attorney's fees, costs of suit; and 
4. For such other and further relief as to 
the court may deem proper. 
To this complaint, the defendants Thomas H~ 
Kendrick and R. F. Schober, filed their answer to 
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to amended complaint as follows, (omitting head-
ings and signatures): 
Come now the defendants, Thomas H. Kendrick 
and R. F. Schober and by way of answer to the 
amended complaint of the plaintiff on file here-
in admit, deny and allege as follows: 
1. Answering paragraphs 1 to 5, inclusive, 
of said amended complaint these defendants in-
corporate by this reference their answers to 
paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's original com-
plaint on file in this action and make the same 
answers to said paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's 
amended complaint as was heretofore made by these 
defendants to paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's 
original complaint. 
2. Answering paragraph 6 of said amended 
complaint these defendants admit that on or about 
the 28th day of November, 1952, the plaintiff was 
charged in the City Court of Ogden City, State of 
Utah, with the commission of a criminal offense, 
to-wit: the offense of drunkenness; and further 
admit that said complaint was signed by T. H. 
Kendrick. Defendants deny the remaining allega-
tions of said paragraph 6. 
3. Answer'ing paragraph 7 of said amended 
complaint the defendants deny +.hat the plaintiff 
appeared in court and was arraigned on the 28th 
day of November, 1952, and allege the fact to b~ 
that said plea of "not guilty" va.,.:; enterec. 
_for the plaintiff by a Judge of the City 
Court of Ogden City in the absence of said plain-
tiff. These defendants further aclmi t that said 
criminal case came on for trial on the 16th day 
of December, 1952, before a Judge of the City 
Court of Ogden City and that the plaintiff 1..ras 
found not guilty at said trial. Defendants deny 
each and every other allegation in said paragraph 
7 set forth not hereinbefore in this paragraph 
of this answe·r specifically adm.i tted. 
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4. Answering paragraph 8 of said amended 
complaint these defendants deny the same. 
5. Answering paragraph 9 of said amended 
complaint these defendants admit that the plain-
tiff demands exemplary and punitive damages from 
these defendants. Said defendants deny the re-
maining allegations of said paragraph 9. 
6. Further answering- said amended complaint 
these defendants deny each and every allegation 
thereof not hereinbefore in this answer speci-
fically admitted. 
7. Further ansvrering said amended complaint 
and as a separate defense thereto said defendants 
allege that the plaintiff was arrested by them 
pursuant to their responsibilities as peace 
officers of the State of Utah·, and that said 
arrest was in all respects lm-rful and proper pur-
suant to the statutes and laws of the State of 
Utah; and further allege that the filing of the 
complaint charging this plaintiff with a misde-
meanor by T. H. Kendrick was~· in all respects 
lavful a.'rld. proper pursuant to the statutes and 
laws of the State of Utah, and these defendants 
further a.llege that their conduct in all parti-
Ctl1ars v.ras in good fait'h and based upon their 
hone$t conclusions from fact observed by them. 
WHEREFORE, said defendants pray that they be 
given judgment in their favor, and that the 
plaintiff take notr~ing by reason of his complaint, 
and that in addition th~reto these defendants and 
each of them be avmrded reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs pursuant to the provisions of the 
statutes of the State of Utah. 
The npfpr...: r- J.- Union Pacific Railroad 
Company and the Ogden Union Railway and Depot 
Company filed their ansvrer to the amended complaint 
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as follows, (omitting headings and signatures): 
Come now the defendants, Union Pacific 
Railroad Company and The Ogden Union Railway 
and Depot Company and by way of answer to the 
amended complaint of the plaintiff on file 
herein admit, deny and allege as follows: 
1. Answering paragraphs 1 to 5, inclusive, 
of said amended complaint these defendants in-
corporate by this reference their answer to 
paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiff's original com-
plaint on file in this action and make the same 
answers to said paragraphs 1 to 5 of plaintiffts 
amended complaint as was heretoi'ore -made by 
these defendants to paragraphs 1 to 5 of plain-
tiff's original complaint. 
2. Answering paragraph 6 of said amended 
complaint these defendants admit that on or 
about the 28th day of November, 1952, the 
plaintiff was charged in the City Court of Ogden 
City, State of Utah, with the commission of a 
criminal offense, to-wit: the offense of 
drunkenness; and further admit that said com-
plaint was signed by T. H. Kendrick. Defendants 
deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph 
6. 
3. Answering paragraph 7 of said amended 
complaint the defendants deny that the plaintiff 
appeared in court and was arraigned on the 28th 
day of November, 1952, and allege the fact to 
be that said plea of ttnot guilty" was entered 
for the plaintiff by a Judge of the City Court 
of Ogden City in the absence of said plaintiff. 
These defendants further admit that said 
criminal case came on for trial on the 16th day 
of December, 1952, before a Judge of the City 
Court of Ogden City and that the plaintiff was 
found not guilty at said trial. Defendants 
deny each and every other allegation in said 
paragraph 7 set forth not hereinbefore in this 
paragraph of this answer specifically admitted. 
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4. Answering paragraph 8 of said amended 
complaint these defendants deny the same. 
5. Answering paragraph 9 of said amended 
complaint these defendants allege that said para-
graph 9 of plaintiff's amended complaint is 
immaterial as to these defendants. Further 
answering said paragraph 9 these defendants admit 
that the plaintiff demands exemplary and punitive 
damages from the defendants Thomas H. Kendrick and 
R. F. Schober. These:defendants deny the remain-
ing allegations of said paragraph 9. 
6. Further answering said amended complaint 
these defendants deny each and every allegation 
thereof not hereinbefore in this answer specifi-
cally admitted. 
7. Further answering said complaint and as 
a further and separate defense these defendants 
allege that the arrest of the plaintiff by the 
defendants, Thomas H. Kendrick and R. F. Schober, 
and the charging of the plaintiff with a misde-
meanor in the City Court of Ogden City by the 
defendant T. H. Kendrick was all done pursuant to 
the authority of said individuals as peace 
officers of the State of Utah; that the same was 
done in good faith; and that said arrest and said 
complaint ~-Tere in all respects la"t-rful and proper 
under the statutes and laws of the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, said defendants pray that they be 
given judgment in their.favor and against the 
plaintiff "no cause of action u' for their costs 
of suit herein, and for such other and further 
relief as to the court shall seem just and equi-
table in the premises. 
On the basis of the foregoing pleadings trial 
was had and the case submitted to the jury on the 
basis of the evidence adduced thereat, and upon 
the court's instructions. Plaintiff objects to 
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and raises upon this appeal the correctness of _ 
instructions numbers 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, and 
17. Said instructions are set out more particu-
larly as follows: 
No. 4. 
Gentlemen of the jury, you are in-
structed that the burden of proof is 
upon the plaintiff to prove by a pre-· 
ponderance of the evidence, or the 
greater weight of t4e evidenqe, each and 
every allegation made by him in hi~ 
complaint before you can find a verdict 
in his favor. 
And if you find and determine 
from the evidence introduced in this 
case that the plaintiff has failed to 
establish the burden of proving the 
allegations of his complaint by the 
greater weight of the evideace, then 
it is your duty to bring in a verdict in 
this case against the plaintiff and in 
favor of the defendants, no cause of 
action. 
But if you find from the evidence 
introduced in this case that the plain-
tiff has proven each of the allegations 
of his complaint by the greater weight 
of the evidence, then it is your duty 
to bring in a verdict in his favor, 
against the defendants. 
No. 5 
You are instructed that the 
defendant Kendrick was not, on the 
27th day of November, 1952, a special 
deputy sheriff of Weber County, Utah, 
9 
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November 27, 1952, provided 
as follows: 
"32-7-13. Drinking and 
drunkenness in public places.--
No person shall drink liquor in 
a public building, park or 
stadium or be in an intoxicated 
condition in a public place." 
"32-8-10. Drunkenness in 
public place.-- Everyone who 
violates any of the provisions 
of section 32-7-13 shall be 
liable for a first offense to 
a penalty of not less than $10 
nor more than $50 and in de-
fault of immediate payment, to 
imprisonment for not more than 
thirty days; for a second 
offense to a penalty of not 
less than $25 nor more than 
$100 and in default of imme-
diate payment to imprisonment 
for not less than one month 
nor more than two months. For 
a third or subsequent offense, 
to imprisonment for not less 
than one month nor more than 
six months~·'wi thout the option 
of a fine.n 
You are also instructed that the 
statutes of this State provided as 
follows: 
"32-8.,.25. Duties of officers 
respecting infringements of this 
act.--All inspectors appointed 
under this act, and all sheriffs, 
deputy sheriffs, mayors, city 
judges, justices of the peace, 
constables, marshalls and peace 
officers, and all district, 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
county, city and town attor-
neys, and clerks of courts 
shall diligently enforce the 
provisions of this act.***" 
Under these statutes it was not only 
the right of the defendants Schober and 
Kendrick but their positive duty under 
the law of this State to arrest the 
plaintiff if, in fact, he was in an in-
toxicated condition at the depot in 
Ogden on November 27, 1952. 
No. 9 
You are instructed that the statu-
tes of the State of Utah in effect at 
the time of the plaintiff's arrest pro-
vided, in so far as material here, are 
as follows: 
"77-13-3. A peace officer may, 
without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a public offense committed or 
attempted in his presence." 
Said statutes in effect at the 
time of the plaintiff's arrest also 
provided, in so far as is material 
here, that: 
"77-13-4· A private person 
may arrest another for a public 
offense committed or attempted 
in his presence." 
You are further instructed that one 
of the ordinances of Ogden City in 
effect on November 27, 1952, provided 
as follows: 
"Drinking liquor in public 
places and drunkenness. Any person 
who shall drink any intoxicating 
12 
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liquor in any street or 
alley, public place, store, 
restaurant, hotel lobby or 
parlor, in or upon any passen-
ger coach, street car or other 
vehicle cornmonly used for the 
transportation of passengers, 
or in or about any depot plat-
form, waiting room or station 
room or in any public gather-
ing of any kind, or vrho shall 
be drunk or intoxicated \·rithin 
the corporate limits of said 
City, shall be deemed guilty of 
a misdemeanor." 
Under the foregoing statutes and 
the foregoing ordinance, Mr. Kendrick 
and Mr. Schober had a legal· right to 
arrest the plaintiff if he violated 
said ordinance while in the presence 
of said officers. Therefore, if you 
believe that the plaintiff did violate 
said ordinance in the presence of 
1-'lr. Kendrick and Mr. Schober on 
November 27, 1952, then I instruct you 
that his arrest by these men was not 
unlawful and the prosecution therefore 
was not 1-rrongful or improper, and your 
verdict must be in favor of the defen-
dants, no cause for action. 
No. 10 
You are instructed that a person is 
drunk or intoxicated within the meaning 
of the Ogden City ordinance I have 
quoted to you when he is under the in-
fluence of intoxica.ting liquor to such 
an extent that he is not entirely him-
self. It is not necessary that a person 
be "dead drunk" or "hopelessly drunk11 
in order that he be considered drunk or 
intoxicated within the meaning of the 
13 
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ordinance. If a person has consumed 
enough intoxicating liquor that his 
mental or physical capacities or his 
judgment o~ his normal control of his 
actions have been materially i.'rrl.paired, 
then such person is drunk or intoxi-
cated within the meaning of those 
words as they are used in that ordi-
nance. 
No. 12 
You are instructed that if you 
find Er. Kendrick had reasonable and 
probable cause for believing that the 
plaintiff was intoxicated in violation 
of said ordinance of Ogden City, and 
further, that Mr. Kendrick did honestly 
and fairly believe. that the plaintiff 
was intoxicated in violation of said 
ordi.nance at the time t.Jhen Mr. Kendrick 
signed the complaint charging the 
plaintiff with said violation, then 
there was no malicious prosecution of 
the plaintiff; and you should not award 
the plaintiff any damages against any 
defendant for such prosecution, even · 
though you now believe, in light of all 
the circumstances shown by the evidence, 
that the plaintiff vras not actually 
drunk or intoxicated on November 27, 
1952, at the depot in Ogden, in viola-
tion of said Ogden City ordinance. 
No. 15 
You are instructed that if you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence 
that Mr. Kendrick made a full, fair and 
t~1thful disclosure of the facts which 
he knew, or which he might have learned 
by reasonable diligence, in any way 
connected with the events of November 27, 
1952, to the Assistant City Attorney, Mr. 
14 
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Sneddon; and further, that Mr. 
Sneddon advised Mr. Kendrick that 
he had probable cause to initiate 
the prosecution of the plaintiff 
for the offense of violating the 
Ogden City ordinance quoted in 
these instructions; and that Mr. 
Sneddon thereafter prepared the 
complaL~t which Mr. Kendrick signed; 
and that Mr. Kendrick in good faith 
did believe that there was probable 
cause to initiate that prosecution, 
then that is a complete defense to 
the portion of this action in which 
the plaintiff alleges a malicious 
prosecution of him by the defendants; 
and in such event, you are instructed 
that you should award the plaintiff no 
damages against the defendants for said 
alleged malicious prosecution. 
No. 17 
You are instructed that the 
plaintiff, in addition to actual 
damages, asks that he be awarded 
punitive damages in the sum of 
$lO,OOOoOO. You are instructed that 
punitive damages, also known as exem-
plary damages, mean damages given by 
way of punishment for the commission 
of a wrong. Punitive damages are only 
allowed where a wrong is committed under 
circumstances evidencing an evil motive, 
~ctual malice, deliberate violence, or 
vindictiveness. You are instructed 
that you may allow punitive damages 
where a wrong is committed under such 
circu~stances as the court has just 
described, but7ou shou~d not do so 
unless you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that Mr. Kendrick or 
Mr. Schober acted with evil motive, 
actual malice, deliberate violence, 
15 
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or vindictiveness. Punitive or exem-
plaiJ damages are not the measure of 
the actual damages sustained, but are 
damages given by way of punislli~ent to 
make an example, for the public good, 
and to deter others from offending in 
a similar manner. Such damages are 
not given as a matter of right, but 
as punishment. Punitive damages are 
to be awarded with caution. Such 
damages should not be disproportion-
ate to the actual damages sustain~d, 
if any, and sho1ild bear some relation 
to the damages complained of and the 
cause thereof. 
If you find for the plaintiff and 
assess punitive or exemplary damages 
in addition to actual damages, you 
must, in the form of the verdict, set 
up the actual and punitive damages 
separately. 
On the basis of the instructions given and 
the evidence, the jury returned a verdict no 
cause of action, whereupon the plaintiff filed 
a motion for new trial, basing his arguments 
primarily upon the refusal of the court to grant 
his proposed instructions 3, 7, 8, and 14, on 
the court's rulings as set forth in paragraph 1 
of plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
The motion for a new trial was denied and 
thereafter the court awarded attorney's fees to 
the defendants pursuant to the provisions of 
16 
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Title 78-11-10 UCA 53. 
Thereafter, and within the time a~~owed by 
law, plaintiff served and filed his notice of 
appeal to this court and filed his statutory 
undertaking upon appeal to this court. 
ASS IGNHENT OF ER...li.ORS 
1. That the court erred in giving ins true-
tion number 4 relative· to the burden of proof. 
l 
2. That the court erred in refusing to 
give plaintiff's proposed instruction number 7. 
3. That the court erred in refusing to 
give plaintiffts proposed instruction number 8 
and in awarding defendant Schober attorney's fees. 
4. That the court erred in giving its 
instruct.ion number 5. 
5. That the court erred in giving its 
instruction number 8. 
6. That the court erred in giving its 
instruction number 9. 
7. That the court erred in giving its 
instruction number 17 and in refusing to grant 
plaintiff's proposed instruction number 21. 
17 
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8. That the court erred in giving its 
instruction number 10. 
9. That the court erred in giving its 
instruction number 15. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NIDIDER 
4 RELATIVE TO THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
This instruction advises the jury that the 
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove by 
a preponderance af the evidence ~ and every 
allegation made by him in his complaint before the 
jury can find a verdict in his favor. The jury is 
here advised that if the plaintiff fails to prove 
all the allegations of his complaint by the greater 
weight of the evidence, that it is then their duty 
to bring in a verdict against the plaintiff and in 
favor of the defendant. 
The instructions as to the burden of proof are 
of primary importance in aiding the jury to inter-
pret the facts of the case to the law of the case. 
Errors and ambiguities in defining the burden of 
18 
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proof and in interpreting it to the jury can 
result in substantial prejudice to the rights of 
a litigant~ 
The general rule is that the burden of 
proof is on the party who has the affirmative of 
an issue as determined by the pleadings and a 
party pleading a fact has the burden of proof as 
to that fact or issue. 
The la'l:J on th:is subject further provides 
that the plaintiff has the burden,of proof as to 
the elements of his cause of' action, at"ld the 
defendant has the bu.rden of establishing special 
or affirmative defenses. 
31 CJS Evidenc~ Section 104. 
This rule of law regarding the burden of 
proof has been Yu;~ther defined as follows: "The 
burden is upon the plaintiff to allege and estab-
lish the facts upon 't.Jhich he relies for recovery. 11 
Eagle Picher Mining and Smelting Co. vs Layton, 
77 P(2) 1137. 
Applying the accepted rules of law to the 
instant case vJe find that the plaintiff alleged 
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the ~allowing ~acts to constitute his complaint: 
1. False arrest and ~alse imprison-
ment by the de~endants. 
2. Malicious prosecution by the 
de~endant Kendrick. 
3. That plaintiff' was entitled to 
punitive d~ages for such 
malicious prosecution, false 
arrest and imprisonment. 
There is no interdependence of these charges, 
the charge of false arrest and false imprisonment 
is a charge which stands alone and is not directly 
related to, nor dependent upon, the establishment 
of' the charge of malicious prosecution and puni-
tive damages. 
The error of this Instruction No. 4 is most 
clearly apparent when it is realized that not only 
did the court fail to advise the jury of the fact 
that the false arrest charge could stand by itself, 
but that the court went further and advised the 
jury of the exactly opposite proposition. The 
court in Instruction No. 4 stated that the burden 
of proof was upon the plaintiff to prove by a pre-
ponderance or the evidence each and ~ allega-
tion made b-y him in his complaint before the jury 
could find a verdict in his favor. 
20 
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,, . 
The prejudice of this instruction to the 
plaintiff's case can easily be seen if one would 
assume from the evidence that the ju~J may have 
found that plaintiff had been falsely arrested 
and falsely imprisoned, but further found that 
the element of malice on the part of the defen-
dants was not proved and that for that reason 
the case of malicious prosecution and subsequent 
DU:."litive damages "t-:ras not Applyint:, 
Ins':;TU.ction Noo 4 to such finding of facts by 
the jury}' it could only h~_ve resulted in the 
entire verdict going aga.".:Lt th: plaintiff and 
b favor of dsfendant ;:;Vf6£L thougq: the j_ury §~ 
flEe; ,.L~~!.))[:~ tb.at the a11Ggations of f'r,lse arrc:s·L 
a-YJ.d false imprisorunent had been proved to their 
satisfaction .. 
In such. a fact situation, a situation which 
is not at all improbable under the pleadings and 
proof of the instant case~ the unfair burden of 
proof required by Instruction Noo 4 could only 
have had the effect of causing plaintiff to fail 
in his entire cause even though the jury were 
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- - \1 
satisfied that he should prevail in his claim f"or 
false arrest and imprisonment. 
An examination of the rules concerning the 
burden of proof in criminal cases is very helpful 
in an analysis of the errors complained of by 
plaintiff in Instruction No. 4. The general rule 
regarding the burden of proof in a criminal pro-
ceeding is as follows: 
"The burden in a criminal case, 
whether for a misdemeanor or felony, 
is on the prosecution to establish the 
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that is to prove every essential 
element of the crL~e charged, every fact 
and circumstance essential to the guilt 
of the accused, as though the whole issue 
rested on it." 22 CJS Criminal Law, Sec. 
566. 
It can be readily seen that the state has the 
burden of proving every essential element of the 
crime and every fact and circumstance essential to 
the guilt of the accused and that the failure to 
prove any one element or any fact and circumstance 
essential to the guilt will result in a failure of 
the entire case of the state. 
The court, in giving Instruction No. 4, im-
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posed an even greater burden upon the plaintiff 
in this case than is imposed upon the state in 
a criminal case. The requirement that the plain-
tiff must prove each and every allegation of his 
complaint mis.led the jury in that it did not make 
any distinction between allegations that were: 
(1) essential to making out a cause of action, 
(2) allegations that '!,.Jere not essential to making 
out a cause of" acticn, (3} allegations that were 
admitted by the defendant's answer, (4) allega-
tions that concerned the cause of action for 
false arrest and imprisorrrnent, and (5) allega-
tions that concerned only the issues of malicious 
prosecution and punitive damages .. 
The svreeping requirement of proving each and 
everz_ allegtltion of -the complaint, t·!ithout the 
qualif~Ting words of "material allegation", and 
vrithout any explanation regarding the distinctions 
set out above could only have resulted in mislead-
ing the jury as to the proper burden of proof re-
quired of the plaintiff. Such an error certainly 
prejudiced the plaintiff's cause in the minds of 
the juryo 
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The case of the American Lumber and Export 
Company vs Love, 84 S 559, was an action against 
a sheriff on his official bond and the court gave 
the following instruction to the jury: 
. "The court charges the jury that the 
burden is upon the plaintiff in this 
case to prove to a reasonable certainty 
every material allegation of its com-
plaint, and, unless the jury find that 
the plaintiff has met such burden by a 
preponderance or the evidence, then the 
verdict must be fo~the defendant." 
The court held that the foregoing charge was 
reversable error ror the reason that it required 
too high a degree of proof by the plaintiff. It 
can be readily seen that the requirements for 
proof on the part of the plaintiff in the above 
case are substantially less than that required 
by the court in Instruction No. 4. 
In the case of Eagle Picher Mining and 
Smelting Company vs Layton, 77 P(2) 1137 ,Oklahoma, 
the following instruction was given: 
W!ou are instructed that the burden 
of proof is upon the defendant to prove 
by a fair weight and preponderance of 
the evidence, all of the material allega-
tions set forth in its answer as submitted 
to you in these instructions, except such 
matters as are admitted by the plaintiff to be 
true." 24 
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The court reversed a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff for the reason that the foregoing 
instruction was error, in that it placed a 
greater burden upon the defendant than is placed 
upon him by the settled rule of law in such 
cases. The court in commenting on the instruc-
tion said:. 
"It is a universal and unvary-
ing rule of law that the burden is 
upon the plaintiff to allege and 
establish the facts upon which he 
relies for his recovery; to allege 
and establish such facts as will 
entitle him to recover. The under-
lying principle in which it is 
planted and from which it has had 
its growth constitutes one of the 
pillars of civil jurisprudence.u 
In all of the foregoing cases the instruc-
contained merely the language to the effect that 
the burden was upon the plaintiff to establish 
the material allegations of his complaint, and yet 
in this case, Instruction No. 4 required the 
plaintiff, not to establish the material allega-
tions of his complaint, but to establish each 
and every allegation of his complaint and stated 
further that if the plaintiff failed to establish 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the burden of proving the allegations of his com-
plaint by the greater weight of the evidence, that 
it was then the duty of the jury to bring in a 
verdict against the plaintiff and in favor of the 
defendants. 
An early Utah case, Stevens vs Stephens, 47 
P 76, is concerned with the question of the plain-
tiffls burden of proof. In that case the complaint 
alleged that the defendants were indebted to the 
plaintiff for goods sold. The answer denies all 
allegations of the complaint and then affirma-
tively alleges that when the goods were bought 
plaintiff and defendants were directors in four 
corporations and that defendants ordered the goods 
in qgestion for the corporations, that the plain-
tiff knew they were being furnished for the cor-
poration, and that no part of the goods were 
received by defendants, except as such agents or 
managers. 
After stating the foregoing facts the court 
held as follows: 
"o~.counsel for the plaintiff requested 
the court to rule that under the plead-
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.. 
ings the burden of proof was on the 
defendants, but the court held that 
the burden of proof was on the plain-
tiff, and so instructed the jury. This 
action on the part of the court is set 
out as one of the causes of complaint. 
It is quite clear that both counsel s.nd 
court were in error. As an abstract 
proposition or law, the statement of 
the court to the jury that 1 the burden 
of proof is upon the plaintiff, and he 
must establish, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, the material allegations 
of his complaint,' is doubtless correct; 
but we are apprehensive that, under the 
pleadings, its application in this case, 
without stating the position which the 
defendants occupied respecting the onus 
probandi, was not only erroneous, but 
misleading to the jury as to the proper 
mode of determining the questior: at 
issue.. The plaintiff i.-Ias bound ·co 
make out a prima facie case, but he · 
-vms not bound to prove, in the first 
instance, that the defendants w-ere 
not acting as agents 1..rhen they crder:?d 
the goods. The mere fact that agency 
was set up in the ansvTer raised no prr:-
sumption that such a relation actually 
existed. Agency was made the basis to 
defeat the plaintiff's claim, and there-
fore it was incumbent upon the defen-
dants to establish it by affirmative 
proof. If, in a court of justice, one 
undertakes to make out a case against 
another, or, by affirmative defense, 
to release himself from the claim of 
another, the burden is on him to fur-
nish the proof to make good his conten-
tion. Whart. Ev. I I 356, 357. In the 
case at bar the onus was on the plain-
tiff to prove his case substantially as 
alleged.. Then, when this was done, it 
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vras incumbent upon the defendants, 
i~ order to release themselves 
from the plaintiff's claim to 
show that the goods were ordered 
by them as managing agents for 
the corporations, and sold by the 
plaintiff with the understanding 
that they -v1ere being purchased by 
the corporations, as alleged in 
the answer. The court having 
failed to instruct the jury 
properly on the question of the 
gurden of proof, the cause must 
be reversed~ and, this being so, 
we do not deem it necessary to 
discuss the ~uestions upon the 
evidence raised in the course 
of the trialo The cause is 
reversed and remanded, with 
directions to the court belovr 
to set aside the order appealed 
from., and grant a new trial," 
The general rule in regard to errors in 
placing the burden of proof-1s stated as follows 
"It is regarded as reversable 
error l.oJhen the instruction places 
the burden on the vrrong party, or 
places on a proper party a greater 
ourden than proving his case by a 
preponderance of the evidence." 
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II 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7 
Defendants Kendrick and Schober in paragraph 
7 of their answer to the amended complaint pled 
the affirmative defense of good faith, and added 
for good measure the allegation that their con-
elusions were honest. As a result of these alle-
gations an issue was raised by the pleadings. 
This issue was granted further cognizance in the 
court's instruction number 2 as follows: 
"Further answering the allegations 
of plaintiff and as a further and separate 
defense these defendants allege that the 
arrest of plaintiff by the defendants 
Kendrick and Schober and the charging of 
the plaintiff with a misdemeanor in the 
City Court of Ogden City by the defen-
dant Kendrick vms all done pursuant to 
the authority of said individuals as 
peace officers of the State of Utah; 
that the same was done in good faith 
(italics ours)." 
It will be observed that the allegation of 
good faith was therefore doubly forced upon the 
consciousness of the jurors and the court at no 
time ever intimated nor instructed that such did 
not constitute a valid defense for any of the 
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defendants. It must be borne in mind that the 
reason for plaintiff's arrest which was admitted 
by the defendants was a violation of the City 
ordinances of Ogden City; to-wit: drunkenness, 
and that such was in fact a misdemeanor. 
A.TJ. investigation of the law relative to the 
defenses available to individuals charged with 
false arrest and false imprisonment indicates that 
probable cause and good faith is a defense where 
the wronged party was charged with the commission 
of a felony but is not a defense where the 
individual is charged with a misdemeanor. The 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah in Oleson vs. 
Pincock, 251P.23 had before it this precise ques-
tion which, interestingly enough, also arose in 
Weber County, Utah. In the Oleson case plaintiff 
brought an action for false imprisonment and 
alleged that the defendants forceably and unla'ltr-
fully deprived him of his liberty. Among other 
things, the defendant attempted to allege the 
defense of good faith. Justice Frick disposed of 
this argument ve~J succulently at page 26: 
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"Where an officer has good cause 
for making the arrest in a felony case it 
is a defense, but merely to show good 
cause for making an arrest in a misdemea~or 
is not a defense." 
The most recent pronouncement on this sul-
ject that we have been able to discover is the 
case of Ware vs. Dunn, California 183 P(2l ~· 
In that case the plaintiff registered in the 
Schuyler Hotel, Long Beach, California and ad-
vised the desk clerk that her husband t.Jas in the 
Navy and 1-ras expected in that evening. She 
attempted to register for both of them and there-
after her husband arrived at the hotel and in the 
course or- time retired to their room. After the 
couple had gone to bed, t,_.m police officers and 
an agent of the hotel rapped o-n the door and 
forced their way into the room, on the pretext 
of making an investigation, and plaintiffs filed 
action charging assault and false imprisonment. 
From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendants 
appealed, a~leging that they had acted in good 
faith, and the court rulul on the contention as 
follo'f..JS: 
31 
· . 
... __ _ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~---u~----.~~----~~~--~--~----------------------------... 
"In the case with vrhich we are here 
concerned the only justification for the 
officers to invade the sanctity and pri-
vacy of plaintiff's room, '"hich was then 
their home, was the right to make an 
arrest. As heretofore pointed out, 
appellant officers were without such 
authority. Their entry under pretended 
color of official right was therefore 
an ~buse of the authority invested in 
them as peace officers, and relegated 
them to the category of trespassers. 
n***the mere belief ol suspicion that 
a misdemeanor is being, or has been, 
com."llitted is insufficient to warrant a.11 
arrest without a warrant; nor may an 
arrest -vlithout a warrant be made on a 
belief, founded on information received 
from a third person, that a misdemeanor 
is being committed." (6 C.J.S., Arrest, 
Sect. 6, pp. 594, 595.) An Officer can-
not justify an arrest on his nr,;:·sonabls 
belief 11 that the person arrested ·Has then 
committino- a misdemeanor (Adair v. Vlilliams, 
24 Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853, 26 A.L.R. 278, 
282). Nor is it sufficient that the 
officer believed that the person appre-
hended was engaged in the comm~ssion of 
a misdemeanor, though such belief may 
have been entertained in the utmost good 
faith (State v. Bradshavr, 53 Nont. 96, 
161 P. 710; State v. Small, 184 Iowa 882, 
884, 169 N. '!.tJ. 116; HcGuire v. State, 19 
-~la. App. 138, 95, So. 565). The cases 
.;,,Rt cited are based on statutes simil~r 
to ours ')n the right of a peace officer 
to make an arrest '1..-rithout H warrant." 
L.--st there be any confusion as to the appli-
cation of this decision to the facts at bar, Sect. 
837 of the California Penal Code provides: 
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"A private person may arrest 
another: for a public offense com-
mitted or attempted in his presence." 
Section 836: 
"A peace officer may without a warrant 
arrest a person, (1) For a public offense 
committed or attempted in his presence." 
The relevant Utah statutes provide: 
77-13-4: "A private person may 
arrest another for a public offense 
committed or attempted in his presence." 
77-13-3: "A peace officer may 
without a warrant arrest a person for 
a public offens€ committed or attempted 
in his presence." 
It does not require any careful scrutiny 
to ascertain that the California statutes and the 
Utah statutes are identical. 
The law in the Ware case is still the law 
in California as illustrated by the case of 
Hanna vs. Raphael Weill and Co., 203 P(2) 564 
where the court stated: 
"It is a settled rule that a police 
officer may not make an arrest for a 
misdemeanor that has not been committed 
in his presence." 
This conforms to the case of Daniels vs. 
Milstead, Alabama (1930) 128 So. 447, where 
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plaintiff sued the defendant, a deputy game warden, 
and his bondsman for false imprisonment and mali-
cious prosecution. The plaintiff was arrested 
without warrant and incarcerated in the county jail 
for allegedly hunting without a license. The court 
discussed the problem of probable cause and good 
faith and held: 
"In false imprisonment, the essence 
of the tort is that plaintiff is force-
ably deprived of his liberty; and the 
good intent of the defendant or the fact 
that he had probable cause that the 
offense was committed and that he acted 
in good faith will not justify or ex-
cuse the trespass. Crumpton vs. Newman, 
12 Ala. 199, Rich vs. Mc!nery, 103 Ala. 
345, 15 So. 663, Gallon vs. House of Good 
Shepherd, 158 Micho 361, 121 NoW. 631. 0 
Relying on the law heretofore set fort~ the 
plaintiff submitted his proposed instruction 
number 7 as follows: 
"Neither an officer nor a private 
person can justify an arrest on his 
reasonable belief, that the person arres-
ted was then committing a misdemeanor. 
The offense must have been committed. If 
the plaintiff was not guilty of the 
offense for which he was charged, then 
you must find for the plaintiff. "Reason-
able belief" or "good faith" on the part 
of the defendants is not a defense. 
Cal. 183; P(2) 133 1947." 
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Which was refused by the court. No comparable 
instruction was at any time given by the court 
nor was the jury even by inference instructed that 
probable cause and good faith was not a defense. 
III 
THAT THE COURT ERRED m REFUSING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 8 AND IN AWARD-
ING DEFENDANT SCHOBER ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Plaintiff's proposed instruction requested 
the court to instruct the jury that neither Mr. 
Kendrick nor Mr. Schober were special officers. 
The court in the first line of its instruction 
number 5 stated: 
"You are instructed that the 
defendant was not on the 27th day of 
November 1952 a special deputy of 
Weber County, Utah and was not by law 
authorized to perform the duties of a 
special deputy sheriff in said County 
" 
The court, on the other hand, by inference in its 
instructions number 8 and number 9 in effect ruled 
as a matter of law that the defendant Schober was 
a special officer. 
This view is confirmed by the court's sub-
sequent granting of an allowance of $250.00 
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attorney's fees to the defendant Schober based 
upon the provisions of 78-11-10 U.C.A. 1953 which 
provides for an attorney fee to be awarded in any 
action filed against a sheriff, constable, peace 
officer, state road officer or any other person 
charged with enforcement of the criminal laws of 
this State in the event that the judgment in the 
cause is against the plaintiff and for the defen-
da.nt. 
This would seem to be conclusive of the 
finding by the Court that Mr. Schober was in fact 
a special or public officer of the State of Utah, 
and more particularly of Ogden City. We submit 
that this is an iricorrect conclusion for the 
following reasons: 
(1) Title 10-6-61 U.S.C. 1953 
provides: "The Board of Commissioners 
of each city.of the first or second class 
shall create, support, maintain and con-
trol a police department and a fire depart-
ment in their respective cities." 
Nowhere is the word "special policeman" provided, 
although by the provisions of 67-12-4 the appoint. 
ment of special police officers by the governor 
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is authorized. The question therefore arises 
as to whether or not the power of creating a 
police department carries with it the pm.rer to 
create special policemen of the type and nature 
presently before the court, or of any type. 
Utah has not ruled upon this precise question, 
however it is submitted that the Utah case of 
Nasfell vs. Ogden City, 249 P(2) 501 lays down 
the test that must be applied and is in fact 
controlling. 
The court -vrill recall that in that case 
the court had before it the problem as to whether 
or not the power of Ogden City given by statute 
to regulate streets and the parking of vehicles 
for a fee included v.Tithin it the implied power to 
establish a rule of evidence bearing upon the 
court. The court ruled in the negative and 
stated as follows: 
"It has been r~=>nP ... +.t=>dly stated 
by this court a municipil corporation 
possesses and can exercise the follo'l.-r-
ing powers and no others: First, it 
is granted in express words; second, 
it is necessarily or fairly implied 
in or incident to the powers expressly 
granted; third, it is essential to the 
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accomplishment of the declared objec-
tives and purposes of the corporation -
not simply convenient but essential. 11 
Certainly it cannot be held that there was any ex-
press grant. It is difficult to conceive that one 
can make a necessary implication that authority to 
create a police department necessarily includes the 
power to appoint special officers. It ·tvould be 
absurd to contend that the appointment of special 
officers was either a convenience or indispensible 
to Ogden City. It was, vJe vJill concede, a con-
venience to the railroads but to no others. 
In the case.of Utah Hapid TraLsit Company 
v. Ogden City, 58 P(2) 3 it was held that the 
statutory authority of a city to construct, main-
tain and operate street railroads carried with it 
no L~plied power to operate motor busses. We sub-
mit that it is self-evident that the duty to main-
tain a police department for the protection of the 
general population in no \vay be deemed to carry 
1trith it the implied power to appoint a special 
officer for the Union Pacific Railroad. 
(2) The Utah Supreme Court in Sheriff of 
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Salt Lake County vs. Commissioner of Salt Lake 
County, 268 P 783, held that before a regular 
deputy sheriff could assume the duties of his 
office, three things had to occur: (a) the 
sheriff had to appoint him; (b) the appointment 
had to be confirmed by the Board of Commissioners; 
(c) the deputy sheriff had to file and sign his 
oath of office. The Chief of Police of Ogden 
City, M. J. Schoor-, testified that it was 
necessary for Mr. Schober to file an oath of 
office (Tr 18). Counsel for the defendant then 
introduced defendant's "Exhibit 211 which provides: 
11 I do solemnly swear I will support, 
obey and defend the Constitution of the 
United States, the Constitution of this 
State, and the ordinances of this City, 
and that I will discharge the duties of 
my office with fidelity, said office 
being Special Officer for O.U.R.&D. Ry. 
Co. /s/ R. F. Schober." 
• 
The defendant, by the introduction of his own 
exhibit, testified more vividly than anything 
plaintiff can say that at no time was he ever a 
special officer of the Ogden City Police Depart-
ment or of any Department of Ogden City, and that 
the only office, if so it can be called, that he 
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held was that of a special officer for his 
employer. 
(3) Even if it can be maintained that the 
statutes of Utah authorize the appointment of 
special police officers of Ogden City and the_t 
defendant Schober had done all the things necessary 
to qualify him to so act, nevertheless, an examina-
tion indicates that before Mro Schober can be held 
to have been acting in the capacity of a special 
officer of Ogden City, it must be found that the 
essential elements of master and servant in fact 
existed bet1-1een Ogden City and the defendant here-
in. One of these essential elements is the element 
of control. As is stated in 56 C.J.S., Master and 
Serva...nt, Section 2{dl, the relationship of master 
and servant exists v.rhen and only -v.rhen the employer 
retains the right to direct the manner _-in which 
the business shall be done as 1t1ell as the result 
to 1G accomplished, or, in othc'r ,.~rords, not only 
1;( e .... , shall be done, but hm-r it shall be done; and 
the existence of such right of control has been 
said to be the really essential element of the 
~elationship. 
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This rule was adopted in Utah in Gleason 
vs. Salt Lake City, 74 P(2) 1225. In the Gleason 
case the plainti~~ tripped over a fire hose and 
was injured. She sued Salt Lake City, a munici-
pal corporation, and the Auerbach Company, a 
corporation. The facts Showed that the superin-
tendent o~ Auerbach Company telephoned the fire 
department and requested that the water be 
pumped from an elevator sha~t. The Chief o~ the 
Salt Lake City Fire Department sent regular ~ire-
men who were on duty for the City and who were 
being paid their regular salaries by the City to 
do this work. They took orders from the master 
mechanic, and the master mechanic from the Fire 
Chief. The court found that the negligence, if 
any, of the firemen could not be imputed to the 
Auerbach Company, because the relationship of 
master and servant did not exist, and at Page 
1228 said: 
"The right of control and the 
exercise of such right was a deter-
mining factor in fixing the liability 
of the employer, notwithstanding the 
employee was paid wages by another." 
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The court quoted vrith approval from Phelps vs. 
Boone, 67 Fed 2nd 574 at Page 575 where it was 
stated: 
11The·usual test in such circum-
stances, that is to say the determina-
tion of liability on the part of a 
servant is the right or power on the 
part of the person charged to command 
and control the servant in the per-
formance of the casual act at the amount 
of performance. Under the conditions 
the employer or master is the person who 
at the moment has power of control." 
In the instant case, R. E. Edens, the superinten-
dent of the O.U.R.&D. Railway Company- the company 
that employed and paid Y~. Schober, made the 
following application for appoLntment of special 
police: 
"APPLICATION~FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL 
POLICE 
"Application is hereby made for the 
appointment of the following OUR&D Co. 
employees, per list attached, as special 
officers without pay from Ogden City, to 
serve for the limited time of 365 days, in 
Ogden City with duties confined to the 
railroad. 
"This application is made upon the 
distinct understanding and condition that the 
said employees are not employees of Ogden City 
and are not. subject to or under the control or 
supervision of the Chief of Police or any 
other representative or official or direct-
ing authority of Ogden City, but on the 
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contrary, are my employees and are 
under my supervision, direction and 
control and are paid by me, and she~l 
act wholly and solely in accordance 
with the duties required by me as his 
employer. 
"And I hereby agree to protect and 
save harmless the said Chief of Police 
and Ogden City, of and from any and all 
loss, cost, liability, damage or expense 
of said appointment, and particularly 
with respect to the requirement's of 
the Workmen's Compensation Law of the 
State of Utah and otherwise. 
"Dated at Ogden, Utah, this 15th day 
of danuary, 1952. 
ttSigned /s/ R. E. Edens 
Supt., The Ogden Union 
Railway & Depot Company 
Address: Ogden, Utah 11 
Note 't.Jho exercise~_,,E:3J2~Vision and directs Nr. 
The transcript of Mr. Edens' testimony OlD_y 
confirms what he has written in his application. 
The testimony of the Chief of Police is as 
follows: 
"Q At any time since the date that 
application for appointment in 
January of 1952 has R. F. Schober 
acted under your direction or 
supervlslon, or as an officer of 
the Ogden City police force? 
"A No, sir." 
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If in the Phelps case the firemen of Salt 
Lake City could not be determined to be the agents 
of the Auerbach Company because the latter had no 
control over their activities, it is submitted 
that the acts of Mr. Schober cannot be held to 
be performed as an agent or special officer of 
Ogden City v.rhen the latter enjoyed the same lack 
of control, and that therefore it must be concluded 
that on the basis of the testimony, not only of the 
Chief of Police of Ogden City, but of ~T. Schober's 
O\m immediate employer, any acts performed by him 
were performed in the course of his employment and 
under thE direction of Mr. Edens. 
Co., Mich. 104 N.W. 38~, plaintiff sued the defen-
dant railroad alleging that he was ejected and ir:-
jured by an employee of the defendant. The defense 
was raised that the individual vlho caused the 
plaintiff to be ejected and injured was in fact a 
special deputy sheriff. The court discussed this 
problem, saying: 
"Many instances are therefore found 
in law books where the public authorities 
I. J. 
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have appointed police officers to 
preserve order in these places, but 
at the expense of those responsible 
for them. So the public authorities, 
in this case, appointed deputy sheriffs 
with the same powers and duties as they 
would exercise in any other place. When 
acting purely in their capacity as police 
officers, the defendant is not responsible 
for their acts. Only when the defendant, 
through its authorized agents has employ-
ed or directed such police officers to 
act for it, does it become responsible." 
It follow~ therefore, that the admitted 
facts show a lack of any control on the part of 
Ogden City and that the duties of Schober of 
necessity were those of an individual and an 
employee. It further follovrs that he was not a 
special officer nor was he acting as such, but as 
a result thereof, he was not entitled to attorneys 
fees vrhich could only have been granted to him had 
he been in fact a public officer acting in such 
capacity. 
IV 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 5 
The portion of Instruction number 5 which 
the plaintiff alleges to be in error reads as 
follows g 
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11You are instructed that the defen-
dant Kendrick was not on the 27th day of 
November 1952 a special deputy of Weber 
County, Utah, and was not by law author-
ized to perform the duties of a special 
deputy sheriff in said county, but you 
are further instructed that on the 22nd 
day of November the aforesaid Kendrick 
was a special agent of the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company and he was, by virtue of 
the laws of the State of Utah and ordin-
ances of Ogden City hereinafter referred to, 
authorized to make lawful arrests in the 
Union Depot at Ogden, Utah." 
It is submitted that while the instruction as such 
is technically correct, it is so grossly mislead-
ing as to result in confusion in that it implies 
that Kendrick enjoyed some status not enjoyed by 
the ordinary mortal. It is true that as special 
agent he was authorized to make a lawful arrest. 
It is likewise true that any person at or in the 
Union Depot at Ogden on the 27th day of November, 
whether they be a special agent~ ordinary employee, 
passenger, or a guest of the Union Pacific Rail-
road, had the power to make a lawful arrest. 
It was found in the Hanna case, supra: 
"Insofar as the employer respondent 
is concerned all this discussion as to the 
status of White seems to be idle since the 
arrest was originally made by Methoe who 
was not a special officer but merely an 
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employee hired to protect her 
employers' property." 
That was precisely the status of ~~. 
Kendrick on the 27th day of November 1952. He 
was merely an employee hired to protect his em-
players' property. Any statement by the court 
that in any way embellishes or adds to, or gives 
him color or office could not be other than pre-
judicial to the rights of the plaintiff. 
v 
TF~T THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NID1BER 8 
The court's 8th instruction reads as 
follovTS: 
"You are instructed, .that the statu-
tes of this State in effect on November 
27, 1952, provided as follows: 
"32-7""'13 ~ Drinking and"' . 
drunkenness in public places ••• 
No person shall drink liquor in 
a public building, park or stadium 
or be in an intoxicated condition 
in a public place." 
"32-8-10. Drunkenness in public 
place.--Everyone who violates any of 
the provisions of section 32-7-13 
shall be liable for a first offense 
to a penalty of not less than $10 
nor more than $50 and in default or 
immediate payment, to imprisonment 
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·. 
for not more than thirty days; for 
a second offense to a penalty of 
not less than $25 nor more than 
$100 and in default of immediate 
payment to imprisonment for not 
less than one month nor more than 
two months. For a third or sub-
sequent offense, to imprisonment 
for not less than one month nor 
more than six months without the 
option of a fine." 
You are also inst~~cted that the 
statutes of this State provided as follows: 
"32-8-25. Duties of officers 
respecting infringement of tpis ac~.-­
All inspectors appointed under this 
act, and all sheriffs, deputy sherirfs, 
mayors, city judges, justices of the 
peace, consta.bles, marshals 2.nd peace 
officers, and all district, county, 
city and town attorneys, and clerks 
of courts shall diligently enforce 
the provisions of this act. -tH**" 
Under these statutes it was not only 
the right of the defendants Schober and 
Kendrick but their positive duty under the 
law of this State to arrest the plaintiff 
if, in fact, he \.Tas in an intoxicated con-
dition at the depot in Ogden on November 27, 
1952. 11 
The court 1,.rill recall that by the pleadings 
it has been admitted that the plaintiff was arres-
ted for an alleged violation of the ordinances of 
Ogden City. It likewise was admitted that a 
criminal action was filed against the plaintiff 
charging him with a violation of the ordinances of 
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Ogden City. It is submitted, therefore, that it 
must be self-evident that the statutes of the 
State of Utah were in no way involved in the 
action, and must be considered entirely irrele-
vant except as it permits a jury to find that the 
plaintiff might not, nevertheless, have committed 
a violation other than the violation charged by 
reason of the State statutes. Further, the last 
paragraph of the instruction is completely at 
variance with instruction number 5 in that it nm .. r 
states that because Kendrick is a special officer 
he had a duty to arrest the plaintiff, when in 
fact, the court had just finished instructing the 
jury to the effect that Mr. Kendrick was not a 
deputy sheriff. 
If there need be any further evidence to 
the effect that the 5th instruction set forth imme-
diately al:xwe was misleading and prejudicial, it 
must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff by the 
immediate subsequent act of the court in calling 
Mr. Kendrick a special officer. This begs the 
issue as to the status of M:r:·· Schober. Plaintiff 
·· ·submits that on the basis of the law and evidence 
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heretofore set forth, the instruction is equally 
inapplicable to him. How, it might be asked, 
could the defendants Schober and Kendrick, have a 
positive duty as officers, to enforce the law if 
they, in fact, were not officers? How can anything 
be inferred other than the fact that the court has 
not only declined to find that Schober was not an 
officer, but has taken out the question of fact as 
to whether he was or was not from the jury, by his 
statement that Mr. Schober, as a special officer, 
had a positive duty? How can any conclusion be 
reached other than the fact that this instruction 
flies in the face of, and repudiates the facts and 
instructions theretofore given? 
VI 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 9 
The same statements made in the preceeding 
objection to instruction number 8 can be repeated 
in instruction number 9. Again, in said instruc-
tion, the court referred to Mr. Kendrick and Mr. 
Schober as officers, not as employees. Again the 
court, as it has throughout its instructions, gave 
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a status to these employees to which they were 
not entitled, and implies a protective cloak which 
is without meaning in lm,r, in view of the fact that 
by statute, the right to arrest by an individual 
for a misdemeanor is the same as the right of an 
officer to arrest for a misdemeanor. Again the 
court misled, confused and prejudiced the rights 
of the plaintiff. 
VII 
THAT THE COURT ER?ED IN GIVING ITS ll{STReCTION 
NUNBER 17 AND IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION ~~illER 21 
Plaintiff makes exception to the court's 
instruction nui11ber 17 because the court failed to 
instruct that the jury could consider the finan-
cial status of the defendant in considering the 
problem of punitive or exemplary damages. The 
plaintiff's proposed instruction number 21 fully 
covered this problem and stated in part: 
"As an element in considering the 
amount of punitive damages, you may 
consider the wealth of the defendants 
because a verdict that may punish a 
person of limited means may not be of 
exemplary effect upon a defendant of 
very substantial means and wealth." 
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In the case of Hilson vs. Oldroyd.l 207 P(2) 759, 
Judge Crockett stated: 
"It is well settled that it is 
proper to receive evidence and to con-
sider the wealth of the defendant as 
bearing upon the issue of punitive 
damages. It is obvious that the same 
amo~mt of money might be a greater 
punishment to a poor man than it wou~d be 
to a rich one .. " 
In addition to the Florida case of Kilgore v~. 
Ki=._go re 2 ""'.9 S (2) 3Q5, we might also refer the 
court to the case of Boic~- vse Bradley Mining 
Co., Idaho 1950 92 Fed Suop 750 and the case of 
farrqtt vs .. Bank of America, Calif. 217 P(2) 89. 
In the Boice case the court stated: 
"Plaintiff, a doctor, sued John 
Bradley, an individual, and the Brad~ey 
Mining Co., a corporation, for malicious 
prosecution and false imprisomnent. One 
of the questions raised on appeal was 
'I.<Thether it 'I.<TaS proper to consider the 
vreal th of the defendant in considering 
damages. The court found it v.ras proper, 
sayingg 
"Beyond the broad general rule just 
mentioned, there are special considerations 
singularly applicable to the case at bar. 
According to the great weight of authority, 
the defendantVs pecuniary ability may be 
considered in fixing the amount of puni-
tive or exemplary damages. There was 
arr~le evidence in the case from which the 
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jury could have inferred and must almost 
certainly have inferred that the defen-
dant, Bradley Mining Company was a 
wealthy company. There is also author-
ity that the status of the plaintiff 
may be considered in fixing the amount 
of the awardo" 
VIII 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NmffiER 10 
Instruction number 10 reads as follows: 
"You are instructed that a person 
is drunk or intoxicated within the mean-
ing of the Ogden City ordinance I have 
quoted to you when he is under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor to such 
an extent that he is not entirely him-
self. It is not necessary that a 
person be "dead drunk" or "hopelessly 
drunk" in order that he be considered 
drunk or intoxicated within the mean-
ing of the ordinance. If a person has 
consu~ed enough intoxicating liquor 
that his mental or physical capaci-
ties or his judgment or his normal con-
trol of his actions have been materially 
impaired, then such person is drunk or in-
toxicated within the meaning of those 
words as they are used in that 
ordinance." 
It is submitted that the instruction is 
not correct in that one may be not entirely him-
self and not have his mental or physical capabi-
lity materially impaired. However, in view of 
the other and infinitely more serious errors of 
53 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which plaintiff complains, he is not disposed 
at this time to labor the court about this 
point except to observe that such error is 
cumulative and overpowering when considered 
with all the other errors present. 
IX 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION 
NUMBER 15 
In excepting to the court's instruction 
num?er 15, the plaintiff is not unaware of the 
decision of the Supra~e Court of Utah in UHR 
vs. Eaton, 80 P(2) 925 and as a result plain-
tiff will not concede that the facts produced 
at the trial do not warrant the instruction for 
the reason that the transcript of the evidence 
is not available before this court. 
There is, however, a second basis for 
objection that can be made at this time. 
In 5~ Corpus Juris Secundum entitled 
''Malicious Prosecution", Section 8lb the text 
states~ 
"In suits for malicious prosecution, 
the defendant may in a proper case~ plead 
specially facts and circumstances which 
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refUte malice and show affirmatively 
assistance of probable cause, or show 
that the defendant acted on the ad-
vice of couns~l ••••• However, if 
defendant thus resorts to a special 
plea or answer it is not sufficient 
for him to state the matters of de-
fense in general terms, as, for 
instance, that he had probable cause, 
or acted on advice of counsel, but 
the facts constituting the defense 
must be alleged." 
It will be seen as a matter of law the 
defense may be classified as an "affirmative 
defense." This is also the position of the 
Supreme Court of Utah which seemed to be held 
in the UHR case whe:re it is called an affirmative 
defense. 
Under the provisions of Rule 8c of Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, it is mandatory that a 
warty set forth affirmatively all matters which 
constitute an affirmative defense. 
An examination of the pleadings indicates 
that the defendants nor any of them set forth any 
facts upon which this defense could be predicated. 
CGNCLUSIO '3 
It is a fundamental rule of law that where 
a court acts upon a fundamentally erroneous theory 
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which is apt to affect adversely the substantial 
rights of the appellant, the court has committed 
prejudicial error, 5 C.J.S. "Appeal and Error," 
Section 1779. The only way that the instructions 
given by the court assume a pertinence to the 
issues raised in the trial which at the same time 
would justify the court's refusal to grant plain-
tiff's proposed instructions as hereinbefore set 
forth is if one will assume that the court was 
applying the law as applicable to felonies as 
distinguished from the law applicable to misde-
meanors. Eliminating special cases ~nd discussing 
only general principals, we find that in misde-
meaner the la1r1 relative to police officers as 
stated in C.J.S. Section 6(2) is: 
11An officer does not have the power 
to arrest without a warrant for a mis-
demeanor not committed in his presence 
and view and an arrest without a warrant 
for a misdemeanor not committed in an 
officer's presence may constitute an 
assault." 
And again at Section 6(4): 
"An officer can not arrest without 
a warrant a person whom he merely believes 
committed a misdemeanor." 
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.• 
Examining Section 8 of the sa..rne title and 
volume we find that the law is substantially 
identical as it affects a private person. There 
we see: 
"To justify an arrest by a private 
person without a warrant for an offense 
less than a felony, where permitted·by 
statute, it is essential that such 
offense shall actually have been 
committed or attempted." 
In view of the fact that we are considering 
an arrest for drunkenness, a misdemeanor, the 
court's ruling does not square with the above 
enunciated principals because, under the above 
law, both private individuals and officers oper-
ate under the same disability and in the instant 
case, the only place where the question as to 
whether Schober and Kendrick were officers becomes 
important is as it affects the liability of either 
the Union Pacific Railroad or the Ogden Union 
Railway and Depot Company, or both, because if the 
aforementioned gentlemen were special officers 
acting vii thin the scope of their duties as 
special officers and not under the control of 
their employers, then there could be no liability 
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on the part or- their respective employers. 
A different problem arises when one considers 
a felony. In 6 C.J.S. "Arrests", Section 6 we 
find: 
11A peace officer may arrest "tvi thout 
a warrant one whom he has reasonable or 
probable grounds to suspect of having 
committed a felony even though the crime 
was not cow~itted in his presence and 
even though the person suspected is, in 
fact, innocent." 
The same volume, Section 8, as it relates to an 
individual, provides: 
nrn order to justify an arrest 
(by a private person), it is necessary 
and sufficient to show that a felony 
was actually committed and that there 
was reasonable groruX5 for suspecting 
that the person arrested committed it. 
Generally mere proof of reasonable and 
probable cause for making an arrest 
without a ;,.;arrant will not justify a 
private person unless a felony has 
actually been com..rnitted." 
As more tersely stated in American Juris-
prudence "Arrest", 22 A.J. Sec_tion 79 
"There is a well established 
difference betYieen what -vdll justify 
an arrest by a private person and what 
i,,;ill justify an arrest by an officer .. 
Defense of the individual must rest 
upon proof both of a reasonable ground 
and of the actual commission of a felony, 
if no felony was com..rnitted an arrest by a 
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private person is illegal and may 
give rise to an action, although 
the same acts would be O.K. if done 
by an officer." 
Applying these rules to the Court's 
instructions it is obvious that the Court 
erroneously applied the law applicable to 
felonies. If this had been a case involving 
a felony then reasonable or probable cause and 
official status would have become of vital 
importance and the instructions requested by 
plaintiff should have been denied. 
Conversely the instructions given by 
the Court were correct if a felony were the 
subject of the action, because the question 
as to whether or not these men were in fact 
officers and/or entitled to the privileges and 
immunities of an officer would be of vital 
importance. 
Ignoring the fact that the court was will-
ing to imply official status to a private employee 
because he was designated as a special agent~ if 
one is willing to apply this incorrect theory and 
basis for instructions, a. logical coherent pattern 
resultso Unfortunately the major premise upon which 
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that theory is based was erroneous in that they 
did not have a felony as the subject of the action. 
It must therefore be concluded that the court, in 
fact, had adopted an erroneous theory and that it 
so instructed the jury on an erroneous theory, and 
that as a result the jury was deprived of the 
opportunity of being properly instructed upon the 
law applicable to the issues raised, which could 
only have resulted in error prejudicial to the 
plaintiff. 
The court's instructions five eight 
and --~n=i=n~e ______ , as a result, were not applicable 
to the issues raised. As the court has stated in 
5 C.J.S. "Appeal and Error 11 , Section 1764: 
~ere an instruction, not appli-
cable to the issue, is clearly calcu-
lated to mislead - and the complaining 
party was prejudiced, the giving of 
such instructions is reversable error." 
See also Hillyard vs. Blair, 47 Ut 561, 155 P 
449; Caperon vs. Tuttle, 100 Ut 476, 116 P(2) 402. 
In assuming a,nd inst~cting the jury to the 
effect that the defendant was a special officer, 
the court again committed reversable error. The 
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., 
rule as set forth in 5 C.J .s., "Appeal and Error", 
Section 1776 is: 
ttQrdinarily the assumption of a 
material fact where the error with re-
gards to it is conflicting or where 
it is unsupported by any evidence will 
constitute ground for reversal." 
The most that can conceivably be held as 
far as Schober is concerned is (1) that there 
was a subsequent conflict in testimony as to 
whether or not Schober was in fact a special 
police officer of Ogden City, and (2) as to 
whether or not he ever acted as a special police 
officer of Ogden City. It is submitted that the 
court's instructions stating that he 'tvas a special 
officer was a clear ass~mption of fact that in-
vaded the province of the jury at best, and, in 
fact, deprived the plaintiff of an explicit 
instruction to the effect that for the purposes 
of the action, Mr. Schober was not a special 
officer. 
Finally, with regard to plaintiff's reques-
ted instructions number seven and eight 
we find in 5 C.J.S. "Appeal and Error" Sec. 1774 
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the following statement: 
'~en a timely request is made for 
instructions which correctly propound the 
law and which are warranted by the plead-
ings••} it is the duty of the court to 
give them unless covered by other instruc-
tions given by the general charge and a 
non-compliance with this duty will necessi-
tate a reversal when it cannot be said that 
the appellant was not prejudicial, as 
where the court refused correct instruc-
tions setting forth the theory of a 
parties case, or where the evidence is 
conflicting and the verdict general and 
it was not possible to say how the jury 
would have resolved the question if the 
requested instruction had been given. 
The refusal to give a proper instruction 
is not rendered harmless •••• by the fact 
that the issue upon which the charge was 
asked below is not urged on appeal. 
"Applying these rules judgment has 
been reversed for prejudicial error in 
failing or refusing to give instructions 
in an action ••• or false imprisonment ••• " 
That the above statement is likewise law in 
Utah see Armstrong vs. Larsen, 186 P 97 where the 
court states: 
"It was the duty of the court to con-
strue the contract and to advise the jury 
of the respective rights of the parties 
thereof. The request embodied a correct 
interpretation of the contract. It was the 
duty of the court to give that or a simi-
lar instruction. The failure to do sq, in 
our judgment, constituted prejudicial error .. " 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that 
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"J 
the court so incorrectly advised the jury as 
to the law applicable to the pleadings involved 
in the case at bar as to hopelessly and irre-
concilably mislead and confuse the jury as to 
render it impossible for the plaintiff to have 
had a fair and L~partial trial, and that as a 
result thereof this case should be reversed and 
a new trial ordered. 
Resr~:octfully submitted, 
DAVID S.. KUJ:~Z, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
